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The authors’ goal with this paper is to give insight into the complex world of EU agenci-
es and the case-law most relevant for development of their role in the EU law. As they gain 
an ever-increasing importance in the EU institutional landscape, and because of the scope 
of powers that are being given to them, they are of interest to all Member States, Croatia 
included. The paper first explains the background and the importance of the Meroni and 
Romano judgements for the subject of EU agencies, following with the overview of the 
newer case-law whose formulation shows evolving in understanding of each of these two 
judgements respectively. In their elaboration the authors will cover the issue of delegation 
of powers to EU agencies from the, mostly but not exclusively, perspective of the primary 
legislation of the EU; case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union; and the 
current but differing academic legal reasoning. Moreover, the authors will pass their own 
judgement and give their opinion on the state of play of agencies in the EU.
Key words: EU agency, delegation of powers, executive powers, discretionary powers, 
judicial overview.
1. 1. INTRODUCTION
The EU is going through a process of ‘agencification’1 or what other authors vividly call 
1 “Agencification refers to the creation of semi-autonomous organizations that operate at arms’ length of the go-
vernment, to carry out public tasks (regulation, service delivery, policy implementation) in a relatively autonomous 
way i.e. there is less hierarchical and political influence on their daily operations, and they have more managerial 
freedoms. There is much controversy over the definition of agencies but a consensus has grown that an ‘agency’ 
in terms of agencification is an organization that (i) is structurally disaggregated from the government and (ii) ope-
rates under more business-like conditions than the government bureaucracy. Agencies can for example have a 
different financial system and personnel policies, although the degrees of financial, personnel, and management 
autonomy vary per (type of) organization. It is exactly this degree of variation between (types of) organizations 
that make it impossible to develop a more precise definition.“ See also: CH Hofmann; H. Herwig; A. Morini, 
studenti Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 
Rad nagrađen Nagradom Pravnik
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‘mushrooming of EU agencies’.2 They appeared for the first time in the EU’s institutional 
landscape in 1975, went through a boom in the 1990’s to finish with more than 40 of them.3 
With the EU institutions more or less susceptible to interests of the Member States (here-
inafter: MSs) and politics, a general raison d’être for establishing agencies was a creation 
of more ‘technical’ bodies which could offer support from the stage of decision-making up 
to implementation of various Union policies. 
Nevertheless, it was not until the pace of their establishment accelerated and not until 
they received ever-wider competences, that their foundations and lack of stronghold in 
the Treaties came into question. Despite the numerous inter-institutional documents which 
followed in dealing with this matter,4 various issues surrounding EU agencies are still not 
completely sorted out. Since the creation of agencies may also mean a delegation of exe-
cutive powers to EU agencies that are not directly accountable to EU citizens, the authors 
of this paper believe that it is paramount to better understand EU agencies, its establis-
hment and the delegation of powers to them. 
Moreover, the paper will examine what are the key legal condiciones sine quibus non of 
delegation of executive powers to EU agencies. In other words, the paper will give insight 
into the complex world of rules on delegation of powers and of the Meroni and Romano 
doctrines which the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: the Court) deve-
loped through the years.
2. THE BEGINNINGS 
Since the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon are not clear on neither the establishment 
nor on the empowerment of Union agencies, when analysing whether a delegation of 
executive powers can be made to EU agencies, EU institutions and numerous legal aca-
demics have, in their analyses, turned to Court’s old rulings in the Meroni from 1958 and 
Romano from 1981, which dealt with institution’s delegation of powers on other Union 
bodies.5 A short overview of the cases will be presented for the sake of understanding the 
system of delegation of powers in the EU that will be further discussed.
In the Meroni case the applicant Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, S.P.A. chall-
enged the High Authority’s (an institution which was counterpart to today’s Commission) 
delegation of powers for the financial operation of the ferrous scrap regime6 to two bodies 
Constitutional Aspects of the Pluralisation of the EU Executive Through “Agencification”, European Law Review, 
4/2012, 38, page 419.
2 M. Busuioc, Accountability, control and independence: The case of European agencies, European Law Journal, 
15/2009, page 600. ; A. Meuwese; Y. Schuurmans; W. Voermans, Towards a European Administrative Procedure 
Act?, Review of European Administrative Law 2009, page 16.
3 For a list of EU agencies see: <https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies_en> (20. 08. 2017.).
4 Commission Communication; The operating framework for the European Regulatory Agencies, European agen-
cies – The way forward; Joint Statement of the European Commission and the Parliament on decentralised 
agencies, <https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/joint_statement_and_common_
approach_2012_en.pdf > (29. 08. 2017.). ; Commission Communication; Roadmap on the Follow- Up to the 
Common Approach on EU decentralised Agencies <https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/
docs/body/2012-12-18_roadmap_on_the_follow_up_to_the_common_approach_on_eu_decentralised_agenci-
es_en.pdf> (27. 08. 2017.).
5 M. Chamon, The Empowerment of Agencies under the Meroni Doctrine and Article 114 TFEU: Comment on Uni-
ted Kingdom v Parliament and Council (Short-selling) and the Proposed Single Resolution Mechanism European 
Law Review, 3/2014, page 382.
6 Iron and steel scrap, also referred to as ferrous scrap, comes from end of life products (old or obsolete scrap) as 
well as scrap generated from the manufacturing process (new, prime or prompt scrap). 
 Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries (definition of iron and steel scrap)
 <http://www.isri.org/recycling-industry/commodities-specifications/ferrous-scrap#.WJUPu vkrLIU> (4. 02. 2017.).
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founded under Belgian private law, which were called the Brussels Agencies. It claimed 
that according to Article 8 of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (hereinafter: 
ECSC) the High Authority has no right to delegate its powers. Though the Court ultimately 
ruled in favour of Meroni, it stated that the possibility to entrust certain tasks to bodies 
established under private law cannot be excluded.7 The Court framed the permission, 
stating that the delegation can never be presumed, but it is always a result of the express 
decision of the delegator and further stressed that the delegator cannot confer powers 
other than those it has itself received under the Treaty.8 Moreover, the Court ruled out a 
delegation of discretionary powers, and explicitly stated that only clearly defined executive 
powers can be delegated, ‘the exercise of which can (…) be subject to strict review in the 
light of objective criteria determined by the delegating authority’.9
The so-called ‘Meroni doctrine’ that has been constructed on the basis of the abo-
vementioned ruling, confirms the ability of the EU institutions to delegate powers to EU 
agencies, but also constrains the delegation of such powers where the use of them would 
require the exercise of wide discretion.10 The Court’s judgment laid down three key condi-
tions (i.e. three key criteria) of the ‘Meroni doctrine’: 
1) An institution may not delegate powers that it does not itself possess; 
2) A delegation of powers, which ‘involves clearly defined executive powers [...] which 
can be subject to strict review in light of objective criteria, determined by the delegating 
authority’, is permissible; 
3) A delegation of powers which ‘involves a discretionary power, implying a wide mar-
gin of discretion, which may [...] make possible the execution of actual economic policy’ 
is impermissible. This is because the power ‘replaces the choices of the delegator by the 
choices of the delegate’ and thereby ‘brings about an actual transfer of responsibility’.11
However, the authors deem that it is important to call attention to the fact that there is 
a serious lack of consensus in the interpretation of the ‘Meroni doctrine’.12
In the Romano case13, in short, the problem was a diminution in the value of the Italian 
lira in comparison to the Belgian Franc, which affected the amount of the pension awarded 
to Mr. Romano. Belgian insurance institution, Institut national d’assurance maladie-invalid-
ité (INAMI) in adjusting proportionately the original decision on the pension grant and spe-
cifying the amount to be recovered used two different exchange rates in its calculations, 
resulting in the request for an amount higher than the amount of benefits paid.
To justify the use of different exchange rates, the INAMI referred to decision No 101 
of the Administrative Commission on Social Security of Migrant Workers, which was em-
7 Case C 9/56 Meroni ECLI:EU:C:1958:7, para 151 subpara 2.
8 Case C 9/56 Meroni ECLI:EU:C:1958:7, para 150 subpara 1 – 151 subpara 2.
9 Ibid., para 152.
10 T. Ambrasas, A legal perspective of the single resolution mechanism, Social Transformation in Contemporary 
Society, 2/2014 <https://www.noexperiencenecessarybook.com/vM6aq/a-legal-perspective-of-the-single-re-
solution-mechanism-social.html> (1.03. 2017.).
 Regulation and Institutional Balance, The Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law & 
Justice <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/01/010301-04.html> (5. 03. 2017.). 
 See more: M. Chamon, EU Agencies: Does the Meroni Doctrine make sense?, Maastricht J.Eur & Comp. L., 
17/2008, page 281 
 <http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/maastje17&div=27&id=&page=> (6.03.2017.). 
;  R. van Gestel, European Regulatory Agencies Adrift: Case C-270/12 United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Judgment of 22 January 2014, Not 
Yet Reported, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2014, pages 188-193.
11 Case C 9/56 Meroni ECLI:EU:C:1958:7, para 152.
12 Chamon, op. cit. (n 5).
13 Case C 98/80 Giuseppe Romano v. Institut national d’assurance maladie-invalidit (Romano) ECLI:EU:C:1981:104.
70 The Delegation of Executive Powers to EU Agencies ...
powered by the Council of the EU (hereinafter: the Council) to fix the conversion rates 
applicable under Article 107 of Regulation 574/72.14. The question that rose from there was 
whether the Council initially could confer legislative power on the Administrative Commi-
ssion.
Both the Court and the Advocate General (‘AG’) concluded that such a conferral is 
not acceptable for two reasons, which became two decisive referring points when talking 
about the Romano doctrine. First, they claimed it is incompatible with the Article 155 of 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) (after the Treaty of Lisbon in 
substance replaced by Articles 290 and 291 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (hereinaf-
ter: TFEU)15 which enabled conferral of implementing powers on the Commission, stating 
that ‘there is nothing in the Treaty to suggest that the Council may delegate legislative 
power to a body such as the Administrative Commission’.16 Second, they pointed that 
the Articles 173 and 177 EEC (now Articles 263 and 267 TFEU) that govern the system of 
judicial protection give the Court jurisdiction only over the acts of the Community institu-
tions.17 Therefore, it is not reconcilable with the constitutional principles of the MSs and 
with the Treaty principles to have ‘an administrative body empowered to make binding 
decisions’.18 In the ESMA case,19 a recent judgement that has also dealt with the issue of 
EU agencies, the Court stated that the Romano case is to be understood as prohibiting 
the conferral of legislative powers on bodies other than the EU legislature.20 The lesson 
from those two judgements, therefore is that legislative powers cannot be delegated on 
the administrative bodies of the EU, but executive powers can.
14 Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 on fixing the procedure for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the appli-
cation of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community, 1972, 
OJ L 74.
 The Regulation is no longer in force. In-stead: Council Regulation (EC) No 1606/98 amending Regulation (EEC) 
No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and 
to members of their families moving within the Community and Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 laying down the pro-
cedure for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 with a view to extending them to cover special schemes 
for civil servants, 1998, OJ L 209.
15 Consolidated version of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012, OJ C 326.
16 Case C 98/80 Romano ECLI:EU:C:1980:267, Opinion of AG Warner, page 1264.
17 Case C 98/80 Romano ECLI:EU:C:1981:104, para 20.
18 Case C 98/80 Romano ECLI:EU:C:1980:267, Opinion of AG Warner, page 1265.
19 In May 2012, the United Kingdom brought an action before the Court seeking annulment of Article 28 of the Re-
gulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 on short selling and 
certain aspects of credit default swaps (OJ 2012 L 86, p. 1). The United Kingdom submitted that Article 114 TFEU 
is not the correct legal basis for the adoption of the rules laid down in Article 28 of the Regulation. The United 
Kingdom also contended, inter alia, that an EU agency, European Securities and Markets Authority (hereinafter: 
ESMA) has been given a very large measure of discretion of a political nature which is at odds with EU principles 
relating to the delegation of powers. Although AG Niilo Jääskinen proposed that Article 28 of the Regulation 
be annulled on the grounds that Article 114 TFEU is not a proper legal basis for its adoption, the Court took a 
different view. The Court took the view in favour of the EU agency, i.e. ESMA, and such a position of the Court 
is regarded as a controversial one in the academia.
 See more on the ESMA case: Case C 270/12 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Euro-
pean Parliament and Council of the European Union (ESMA) ECLI:EU:C:2014:18; Case C-270/12 United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2012] 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:562, Opinion AG Jääskinen. ; See also: P. Nicolaides, N. Preziosi, Discretion and Accountability: 
The ESMA Judgment and the Meroni Doctrine, Bruges European Economic Research Papers 30/2014 <http://
aei.pitt.edu/57214/> (14. 04. 2017.). ; S. Gabbi, The Principle of Institutional (Un)Balance after Lisbon European 
Journal of Risk Regulation, 5:2/2014, page 259. ; N. Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, 
OUP , 2014. ; M. Simoncini, Legal Boundaries of European Supervisory Authorities in the Financial Markets: 
Tensions in the Development of True Regulatory Agencies, YEL, 34/2015, page 319.
20 Case C 270/12 ESMA ECLI:EU:C:2014:18, para 60.
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In the two judgments, the Court and the AGs stayed relatively concise in delivering the-
ir argumentation,21 the details of which will be discussed later, which had consequences 
for the rulings’ clarity and academic consensus on both their legal elements and ‘prece-
dential’ importance.22 The first one to say that the conditions from the Meroni apply to the 
transfer of (implementing) powers to agencies was AG Geelhoed in the case Commission 
v Parliament and Council in the year 2000, but he did not go further than mentioning it in 
a footnote.23 Five years later, the Court applied the ‘Meroni doctrine’ (i.e. the three Meroni 
criteria) in the case Tralli24 to a situation of an internal delegation of powers within the ECB, 
and at about the same time, in Alliance for Natural Health25 on the delegation of powers 
from the Community legislator to the European Commission (hereinafter: the Commissi-
on). From then on, the Meroni doctrine was a constant litmus test when considering lega-
lity of delegation of powers within the Union, but its interpretation, as it will be seen, was 
changing over the time. On the other side, Romano was less referred to,26 even though 
some authors claim that Romano judgment bears more resemblance to the problem of 
empowerment of contemporary agencies than the Meroni judgment does.27
There are four main objections to the uncritical reliance on the three Meroni conditions 
(i.e. criteria). The first is the difference between the bodies in question, because in Meroni 
the Brussels Agencies were founded under private law, whereas Union agencies are pu-
blic bodies established by secondary law.28 The second one, the delegator in the Meroni 
was the High Authority (today’s parallel would be the Commission) in contrast to the EU 
agencies which are established and empowered by the Union legislature.29 The third, the 
reasoning behind the Meroni was based on the ECSC Treaty, distinct from the EU Treaties 
currently in force.30 And lastly, somewhat derived from the last difference, one of the most 
pivotal concerns of the Meroni (and Romano even more) was the lack of judicial supervi-
sion over the acts of the non-institution bodies, whereas today articles 263 and 267 TFEU 
explicitly subject agencies to Court’s jurisdiction.31
Nevertheless, since even after the Treaty of Lisbon the agencies are too scarcely men-
tioned in the Treaties to offer solid legal framework for their establishment and functio-
ning, and the Court in the aforementioned ESMA case considered Meroni and Romano 
judgments in reaching its decision, the EU legislator is bound to have in mind the con-
straints of both of them in its future legislative acts concerning agencies and agency-like 
structures. Being so, the authors hold that only the analysis of the initial, then the evolving 
and finally current understanding of the two rulings can provide the understanding of the 
Meroni and Romano doctrines.
21 Case C 98/80 Romano, ECLI:EU:C:1980:267, Opinion of AG Warner; Case C 9/56 Meroni, ECLI:EU:C:1958:4, 
Opinion of AG Roemer.
22 Chamon, op. cit. (n 10), page 289.
23 Case C-378/00 Commission of the European Communities v European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union ECLI:EU:C:2002:561, Opinion of AG Geelhoed, para 59.
24 Case C 301/02 Carmine Salvatore Tralli v European Central Bank ECLI:EU:C:2005:306.
25 Case 154/05 Alliance for Natural Health ECLI:EU:C:2005:449.
26 Score being 11:7 for AGs vs. The Court in regard of how many times they have mentioned Romano.
27 Chamon points to three reasons, namely a) it was ruled under the EEC Treaty and not under the ECSC Treaty; b) 
the delegator was a legislator, and not an executive branch; and c) the delegate was a body established under 
secondary law. See more: M. Chamon, EU Agencies Between Meroni and Romano or the Devil and Deep Blue 
Sea, Common Market Law Review, 48/2011, page 1060.
28 Case C 270/12 ESMA ECLI:EU:C:2013:562, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, para 69.
29 Chamon, op. cit. (n 25) page 1059.
30 Case C 270/12 ESMA ECLI:EU:C:2013:562, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, para 69.
31 Ibid., para 72.
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The part, which the authors of this paper named the ‘initial understanding’ of the ruling 
can be seen as the academic analysis of the Meroni and Romano judgments itself and in 
themselves, independent of the further development of the case-law of the Court on the su-
bject. ‘The evolving understanding’ necessarily turns more to the Court’s point of view, while 
‘the current understanding’ is initiated by the recent Court’s judgments and then followed by 
conflicting opinions of the academics. In the following section, each stage will be discussed. 
In the end, it is also important to mention the Les Verts judgment,32 which influenced the 
amendments of the Treaty of Lisbon that changed the articles, specifically Articles 263, 265, 
267 and 277 TFEU, that refer to the system of judicial review, now explicitly stating that ‘[t]
he Court of Justice of the European Union shall (…) review the legality of acts of bodies, 
offices or agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.’33 
The Les Verts case allowed a possibility to interpret the existence of the Court’s juris-
diction to review acts of agencies even without the express jurisdiction being given to the 
Court (as in the Treaty of Lisbon today). Reasoning from the Les Verts case, advocating for 
the judicial review of the agencies’ acts, was also one of the arguments that influenced the 
debate about the appropriateness of delegation of powers to EU agencies.
3. MERONI V. HIGH AUTHORITY 
From the previous subchapter, as far as the Meroni case is concerned, two points can 
be noted. First, from the short layout of the facts and the Court’s arguments it can be seen 
that the ruling contains several elements which make up what we today refer to as ‘The 
Meroni doctrine’.34 Second, the lack of academic consensus and (op.a. one could think 
of adding Court’s) consistency on the interpretation of the legal elements of the Meroni 
judgment has been indicated.35 
According to Chamon, there is only one obvious reiterative element in the analyses of 
various authors, the one prohibiting a delegation of discretionary powers.36 She continues 
to identify six other elements which occur with more or less frequency:37
(a) the delegating authority can delegate only the powers it itself has received under 
the Treaty (general principle that nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam 
ipse habet);38
(b) the delegator must retain the right of supervision;39
(c) delegated powers must be transferred with an express decision;40
32 Case C 294/83 Parti écologiste «Les Verts» v European Parliament ECLI:EU:C:1986:166, para 23; Case T 411/06 
Societá generale lavori manutenzioni appalti Srl v European Agency for Reconstruction (AER) ECLI:EU:T:2008:419.
33 Before the Treaty of Lisbon, the so called ‘Les Verts doctrine’ from the 1986 was referred to in attempt to fill in 
lacuna in the system of judicial protection. It claimed that since the EEC is a community based on the rule of 
law, neither the MS or any of Community’s institutions can avoid review of measures adopted by them, regar-
dless if they are explicitly mentioned in the Treaties or not. This was later backed in the Sogelma case as well, 
discarding the claim that such reasoning applies only to the institutions but excludes bodies established by 
secondary law, Case C 294/83 Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v European Parliament ECLI:EU:C:1986:166, para 
23; Case T 411/06 Societá generale lavori manutenzioni appalti Srl v European Agency for Reconstruction (AER) 
ECLI:EU:T:2008:419.




38 Case C 9/56 Meroni ECLI:EU:C:1958:7, para 150 subpara 1; Nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam 
ipse habet is a Latin phrase meaning ‘no one can transfer a greater right than he himself has’. 
39 Case C 9/56 Meroni ECLI:EU:C:1958:7, para 152 subpara 3, 5.
40 Ibid., para 151 subpara 2.
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(d) judicial review of the acts of the delegate must be ensured;41
(e) the institutional balance should be observed;42 and
(f) the delegation is legitimate only if necessary to perform the tasks concerned.43
The authors think that the above-described elements can be found in the judgment, 
and since they are backed by Chamon’s text, they do not consider them disputable. What 
the authors find interesting is the possibility of ‘reading into’ the same text done by various 
authors, resulting in different emphasis given to one or another element and different un-
derstanding of certain arguments of the Court.
For Example, Rob van Gestel detects ‘a twofold ratio’ behind the Meroni (and Romano 
as well).44 Namely, an institutional balance of powers and a lack of judicial supervision by 
the Court.45 For the first, he asserts that a broad discretionary power delegated to a body 
which is ‘not directly democratically accountable’ could upset the Treaty based institu-
tional balance of powers between the legislative, executive and judiciary branch.46 His 
second concern was straightened out, as was already mentioned, with the changes made 
by the Treaty of Lisbon and with the change in Article 263 TFEU. Articles 265, 267 and 
277 TFEU also subject acts of the bodies, offices or agencies to the Court’s jurisdiction.47 
Professor Ellen Vos focuses on the first concern, and according to her, the problem of 
agencies disturbing the principle of institutional balance is not just pivotal, but rather a 
single concern of the Meroni judgment.48 
On the other side, Chamon continuously argues in her articles on this subject that 
one has to interpret the ruling within context of its time.49 Therefore, its reasoning cannot 
be automatically transferred on contemporary concepts, et vice versa, one cannot ‘read’ 
today’s understanding of certain concepts into older judgments. Hence, she claims that 
the Meroni’s concern is ‘balance of powers’ in the sense of Court’s jurisdiction over the 
acts of the institutions, and the distortion of that balance if ‘outside’ bodies are empowe-
red to take binding decisions without the possibility to review them.50 Consequently, the 
‘institutional balance’ is qualitatively different concept which did not yet exist in today’s 
form at the time of the Meroni judgment.51
Therefore, as the ‘balance of powers in the sense of Court’s jurisdiction over the acts 
of agencies’ is the main concern, the authors would expect Chamon to conclude more 
openly that the changes brought in Article 263 from the Lisbon Treaty have solved all the 
problems. However, Chamon believes that uncritical reliance on the Meroni is misleading 
and calls on ‘more thorough analysis of the ruling’ in order to ‘clarify to what degree the 
doctrine is still relevant today’.52
41 Ibid., para152 subpara 2.
42 Ibid., para 152 subpara 8.
43 Ibid., para 151 subpara 12, 13.
44 Same wording in case C 270/12 ESMA ECLI:EU:C:2013:562, Opinion of AG Jääskinen para 64.
45 Gestel, op. cit. (n 10).
46 Ibid.
47 Article 265 TFEU ensures judicial review in the case of failure to act, article 267 TFEU states that the Court can 
give preliminary rulings concerning validity and interpretation of their acts, and article 277 TFEU deals with the 
acts of general application.
48 See more: E. Vos, Agencies and the European Union’, in Luc Verhey and Tom Zwart (eds) Agencies in European 
and Comparative Perspective (Intersentia Antwerp 2003).
49 Chamon, op. cit. (n 10); Chamon, op. cit. (n 25), page 1058.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Chamon, op. cit. (n 25).
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Similarly, Dehousse questions the mere application of the Meroni doctrine on today’s 
agencies vested with executive powers due to the changed context and different insti-
tutional setting created by changes of the Treaties.53 Unlike in the ECSC where the High 
Authority had centralized regulatory powers,54 under the Treaties in force after the decision 
is taken by the European institutions, MSs and their administrative apparatus are primarily 
charged with the implementation.55 Therefore, Dehousse notices that ‘[a]ssuming imple-
mentation powers are to be given to some administrative agency, those powers would 
rarely be taken away from a Community institution; they would instead be removed from 
national administrations.’56 On the other hand, the Meroni doctrine is concerned with the 
delegation of powers ‘which the delegating authority itself received under the Treaty’.57 
Hence, he thinks the term ‘Europeanization’ rather than ‘delegation’ better describes the 
process where ‘the powers are transferred vertically (from the national to the EU level)’.58 
Surprisingly, not a lot of authors give attention to this issue.
On the other hand, the authors of this paper hold that the problem briefly addressed 
by Dehousse and more broadly by Hofmann and Morini,59 that is, the difference between 
delegation and conferral of powers could in the future be used as the ‘safe way out’ by 
the Court, would other Union agencies’ powers be challenged in front of it. In various un-
connected situations, some Union bodies have shown they are aware of the difference as 
well. Council’s legal service, when discussing powers of the Office for the Harmonization 
of the Internal Market (OHIM), stated that ‘this specific case concerns the conferring of 
new powers, i.e. powers which have not at the moment been vested in any Community 
institution (…) so the decisions of the Court in the Meroni case do not seem to apply in 
this context’.60
The evolving understanding of the issue has been under the influence of the Court’s 
approach to the problem. In both recent cases Kingdom of Spain v. Council of the Europe-
an Union and Kingdom of Spain v. European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union concerned with the empowerment of the European Patent Office (hereinafter: EPO), 
the Court ruled that since the Council in the first case and the Union legislator in the se-
cond have not delegated powers that are exclusively theirs under EU law, the principles 
of the Meroni doctrine do not apply.61 Lastly, AG Jääskinen in his Opinion in the ESMA 
made the distinction as well, claiming that ‘EU legislature is not acting as a ‘delegating 
authority’ in the sense of the Meroni judgment when it confers implementing powers (…) 
but a constitutional actor exercising its own legislative competence’ and therefore it can 
‘confer on institutions or bodies [executive powers which] are qualitatively different from its 
53 R. Dehousse, Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation of European Governance, Jean Monnet Working Paper 
2:12/ 2022 <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/02/020201.html> (15. 02. 2017.).
54 Ibid.
55 Art 291 TFEU.
56 Dehousse, op. cit. (n 51).
Such a statement corresponds to the AG Jääskinen’s reasoning in the ESMA case on the validity of article 114 TFEU 
as a legal basis for empowering ESMA.
57 Case C 9/56 Meroni ECLI:EU:C:1958:7, para 150.
58 Dehousse, op. cit. (n 51); Case C 270/12 ESMA ECLI:EU:C:2013:562, Opinion of AG Jääskinen.
59 Hofmann, Morini, op. cit. (n 1); Chamon discusses the difference as well. See more: M. Chamon, op. cit. (n 5), 
page 397.
60 Council of the European Union, Opinion of the Legal Service, Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Regulation 
on the Community Trade Mark (5837/85) 6 June 1985, 6.
61 Case C 146/13 Kingdom of Spain v. European Parliament and the Council of the European Uni-
on ECLI:EU:C:2015:298, para 87; Case C 147/13 Kingdom of Spain v. Council of the European Union 
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own powers.’62 Unfortunately, the Court in the ESMA case made no remarks on this AG’s 
reasoning, but rather it used the terms interchangeably, leaving this question unresolved.63
Though it seems that the problem of distinction between the notion of delegation and 
conferral of powers on agencies appears regularly, it looks like avoiding to give a clear 
answer and adopting a consistent approach occurs with the same frequency. 
Certain steps have been taken by the Court itself in what Pelkmans and Simoncini 
call a ‘very gradual process of the EU coming to terms with the appropriate and justified 
degree of delegation to EU agencies (…) for the completion and proper functioning of the 
single market’, or shorter, ‘Mellowing Meroni’.64 
In the case Schräder, dealing with the Community Plant Variety Office (hereinafter: 
CPVO), a Union agency, General Court stated that ‘where a Community authority is called 
upon, in the performance of its duties, to make complex assessments, it enjoys a wide me-
asure of discretion, the exercise of which is subject to limited judicial review’.65 Therefore, 
delegation of clearly defined executive powers subject to the strict review, as a request 
from the Meroni judgment does not exclude any possibility for an agency to exercise some 
degree of discretionary powers.66 Moreover, in the Rütgers case concerned with the de-
cision of the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), General Court seemed to validate the 
reality of agencies’ functioning, observing that ‘it must be acknowledged that the ECHA 
has a broad discretion in a sphere which entails political, economic and social choices on 
its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments.’67
Here, the authors would like to point to the discrepancy with the Commission’s Draft 
Interinstitutional agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory agen-
cies (that was abandoned at the end), where it is stated that agencies cannot ‘have decisi-
on-making powers conferred on them in areas in which they would be required to arbitrate 
in conflicts between public interests or exercise political discretion’.68 Even if one could 
argue that political, economic and social choices do not always amount to a wide public 
interest, it is hard to imagine how the EU legislator would in some future agency-creati-
on-and-empowerment-situation be able to clearly separate those moments in order to 
arrange decision-making of the agency.
Nowadays, what the authors referred to as the ‘current understanding of the Meroni 
doctrine’ is mostly marked by the ESMA judgment. Since the arguments from the ESMA 
regarding plea in law alleging breach of the principles governing delegation of powers laid 
down in Meroni differ between the AG and the Court, each will be analysed separately.
AG Jääskinen holds that the two main concerns behind the Meroni were the absence 
of a Treaty based criteria for delegation of powers, which in turn could upset the institutio-
nal balance, and the lack of judicial review.69 Then he points to the changes brought by the 
Treaty of Lisbon in Articles 263, 265, 267 and 277 TFEU which ensure Court’s supervision 
of the acts of the agencies.70 With that, he concludes that ‘it is evident that agencies can 
62 C 270/12 ESMA ECLI:EU:C:2013:562, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, para 91.
63 Chamon, op. cit. (n 57).
64 J. Pelkmans, M. Simoncini, Mellowing Meroni: How ESMA can help build the single market, CEPS Commentary, 
2014.
65 Case T 187/06 Ralf Schräder v Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) ECLI:EU:T:2008:51, para 59.
66 Chamon, op. cit. (n 10).
67 Case T 96/10 Rütgers Germany GmbH and Others v European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) ECLI:EU:T:2013:109, 
para 134.
68 Commission, Draft Interinstitutional agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory agenci-
es, 59/2005, page 12.
69 Case C 270/12 ESMA ECLI:EU:C:2013:562, Opinion of AG Jääskinen para 72.
70 Ibid., para 73.
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be vested with powers to take legally binding decisions’, because ‘[o]therwise these Treaty 
amendments would be meaningless’.71 With the analysis of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, 
which are actually ‘Romano’ articles so they will be given a fair share of attention later in 
this paper, he asserts that ‘[a]gencies necessarily have to be precluded from Article 290 
delegations of power because the exercise of such powers changes the normative content 
of legislative acts’,72 but gives clearance for the delegation of article 291 TFEU implemen-
ting powers.73 Within that conclusion, Meroni stays relevant with two requests: 
a) powers cannot be delegated to an agency that are different from the implementing 
powers the EU legislature has conferred on the delegating authority, be it the Com-
mission or the Council, and 
b) the powers delegated must be sufficiently well defined so as to preclude arbitrary 
exercise of power.74
Aside from that, as already mentioned, AG makes a difference between conferral and 
delegation of powers, with the consequence that the Meroni applies only to the latter.
The Court opted for, what is in literature already called ‘Meroni-light’ interpretation. 
Among all the mentioned elements comprised in the original Meroni judgment, in the 
ESMA ruling the Court considered the prohibition to delegate discretionary powers as 
the single one important.75 By concentrating on the specific context of the Short Selling 
Regulation that was in question,76 the Court stressed the importance of powers to be 
‘precisely delineated and amenable to judicial review in the light of the objectives establis-
hed by the delegating authority.’77 Unfortunately, due to line of argumentation that relied 
heavily on the text of the Regulation in casu, as Niamh Moloney observed, ‘the extent to 
which discretion has been confined in a particular case remains the touchstone for the 
legality of agencies’ operational powers.’78 Some authors draw attention to the fact that 
even though ESMA was reported later, neither the Court nor the AG in their call for limiting 
discretionary powers mentioned Rütgers case which allowed for ‘a broad discretion in a 
sphere which entails political, economic and social choices’ while undertaking complex 
assessments.79 Also, Chamon and Moloney both note that the only additional requirement 
the Court has retained in regard to delegating powers to agencies is a ‘high degree of 
professional expertize’80 that the agency should have in order to justify the delegation.81 
As mentioned earlier as well, the Court did not follow the AG’s differentiation between the 
delegated and conferred powers.
From the analysis of different interpretations of the Meroni judgment, as well as from 
the analysis of a notion of dissent over the recent Meroni-related developments, the aut-
71 Ibid., para 74.
72 Ibid., para 85.
73 Ibid., para 86.
74 Ibid., para 88.
75 Case C 270/12 ESMA ECLI:EU:C:2014:18, para 41.
76 Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps. 
 Text with EEA relevance (2012) OJ L 86.
77 Case C 270/12 ESMA ECLI:EU:C:2014:18, para 53.
78 N. Moloney, European Banking Union: Assessing Its Risks and Resilience, Common Market Law Review, 
51/2014, page 1661.
79 Case T 96/10 Rütgers Germany GmbH and Others v European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) ECLI:EU:T:2013:109, 
para 134; Chamon poses interesting question regarding Court’s claim that ESMA’s powers are amenable to 
judicial review, anticipating circular answer: ‘Is this really the case if, in a future hypothetical action, an ESMA 
decision is challenged and the General Court observes that ESMA enjoys a broad discretion allowing it to make 
political, economic and even social choices?’ See more: Chamon, op. cit. (n 5).
80 Case C 270/12 ESMA ECLI:EU:C:2014:18, para 85.
81 Moloney, op. cit. (n 76); Chamon, op. cit. (n 57).
77Pravnik, 51, 1 (102), 2017
hors reached a few conclusions. First, the concept of ‘a rigid Meroni’ is clearly unfit for 
today’s reality in which agencies are not just needed on the EU level, but already execute 
tasks that in the 1950s would be in breach of the Meroni judgment.82 Therefore, evolving 
interpretation of the judgment goes hand in hand with the changed context. Second, for 
deciding on the legality of delegation of powers on the (existing or) future agencies, the 
key will be case-by-case scrutiny of how precisely are those powers delineated to be 
amenable to judicial review in the light of the delegator’s objectives. Finally, to improve the 
functioning of the single market, the Court ‘has to’ allow for effective functioning of the 
Union agencies. Having that in mind, it is fair to admit that the ESMA judgment is in that 
attempt just short of touching the constitutional boundaries, but nevertheless serves as 
an encouraging signal.83
To summarize in the words of Pelkmans and Morini, the time has come to stop using 
Meroni as a convenient excuse to stall the growing role of the EU agencies in the integra-
ted market.84 
 
4. GIUSEPPE ROMANO V. INSTITUT NATIONAL D’ASSURANCE MALADIE- 
INVAVLIDITÉ
The Romano judgment is less dwelled upon,85 but it is an equally important ruling when 
it comes to the delegation of powers on EU bodies. As aforementioned, the Court did not 
present a lot of arguments but simply stated that:
‘It follows both from Article 155 of the Treaty and the judicial system created by the 
Treaty, and in particular by Articles 173 and 177 thereof, that a body such as the Admini-
strative Commission may not be empowered by the Council to adopt acts having the force 
of law.’86
In a sole sentence, two main issues of the judgment are visible. First, since the Article 
155 EEC (after the Treaty of Lisbon in substance replaced with Articles 290 and 291 TFEU) 
explicitly mentions only the possibility for the Council to confer implementing powers on 
the Commission, AG Warner and the Court concluded that ‘nothing in the Treaty sugge-
sts that the Council may delegate legislative power to a body such as the Administrative 
Commission.’87 Second, again both of them agreed that the system of judicial protection 
under Articles 173 and 174 EEC (now 263 and 267 TFEU) subjects to judicial review only 
acts of Community institutions, thus precluding empowerment of other bodies to take 
binding decisions.88 
At the beginning of the analysis of the evolution of the interpretation of the Romano 
judgment, it is interesting to notice that all these conclusions were reached without a 
single referral to the Meroni case which dealt with the similar matter, neither from the 
Court or the AG Warner.89 This observation was brought up after the Court in the ESMA 
case completely subsumed Romano under the Meroni judgment, stating that ‘it cannot be 
82 E. Ferran, European Banking Union: Imperfect, But It Can Work, in: Busch, Ferrarini (eds), European Banking 
Union, Oxford University Press, 2015, page 83.
83 Ibid.
84 Pelkmans, Simoncini, op. cit. (n 62).
85 In a bit overexaggerated words of Chamon, another interesting case that is ‘mentioned by fewer authors and 
analysed by none’. See more: Chamon, op. cit. (n 25).
86 Case C 98/80 Romano ECLI:EU:C:1981:104, para 20.
87 Case C 98/80 Romano ECLI:EU:C:1981:104, para 20; Case C 98/80 Romano ECLI:EU:C:1980:267, Opinion of 
AG Warner, p.1264.
88 Ibid., page 1265.
89 Chamon, op. cit. (n 25), page 1061. 
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inferred from Romano that the delegation of powers to a body such as ESMA is governed 
by conditions other than those set out in Meroni v High Authority’.90 The authors hold that 
such Court’s move is a straightforward example of the depth of the Court’s interpretative 
role in the system of EU law, often used to ‘adjust’ the existing provisions of the Treaty and 
the case-law to the ever-evolving scope of the Union law.
Similar to different opinions surrounding the Meroni judgment, various authors have 
put an emphasis on distinct parts of the Romano ruling. For example, Griller and Orator 
focus on the institutional balance (analysed earlier in the Meroni discussion), arguing that 
since the Article 155 EEC mentioned only the Commission as a possible delegate, vesting 
implementing powers on some other body would infringe Commission’s prerogatives, and 
thus institutional balance as well.91 Others disagree, claiming that since AG Warner argued 
significantly broader on the problem of Articles 173 and 174 EEC, the central issue of the 
Romano case, i.e. why agencies and similar bodies were barred from adopting decisi-
ons of general application, was actually a lacuna in the system of judicial protection of 
individual rights under the EEC Treaty.92 Türk, on the other hand, gives a lot of meaning 
to the Court’s phrase stating that the Administrative Commission cannot be empowered 
to adopt ‘acts having the force of law’,93 therefore asserting that the Romano goes even 
further than the Meroni and prohibits all delegations of decision-making powers on bodies 
other than institutions mentioned in the Treaty.94 Chamon directly counterargued,95 while 
the AG Jääskinen in his Opinion in the ESMA judgment had the same reasoning as she 
did, pointing to the German, French, Spanish and Dutch language versions of the ruling, 
which refer to the ‘prohibition on the adoption by agencies of normative measures’96 as 
opposed to English ‘acts having the force of law’ which could be understood as all acts 
binding on the third parties. This was one of the arguments that has led AG Jääskinen 
to state that agencies can be subject to a delegation of Article 291 TFEU implementing 
acts.97
As far as the current understanding of the Romano, one point at which all authors 
concur, is that after the changes brought by the Treaty of Lisbon, Articles 263, 265, 267 
and 277 TFEU subject acts of the agencies to the judicial review of the Court, with that 
dismissing the whole second issue of the Romano judgment. As it was already multiple 
times pointed out, in the ESMA case AG Jääskinen took that as an ‘indirect’, and the Court 
as an ‘express’ sign that Union bodies, offices and agencies are allowed to adopt acts of 
general application.98
On the other hand, the authors question how can a possibility to bring an EU agency 
under judicial review lead to the conclusion that this agency can adopt acts of general 
application. The authors believe that a reverse logic would be more appropriate – if it is 
90 Case C 270/12 ESMA ECLI:EU:C:2014:18, para 66.
91 S. Griller, A. Orator, Everything Under Control? The „Way Forward” for European Agencies in the Footsteps of the 
Meroni Doctrine, European Law Review, 35/2010.
92 M. Everson, E. Vos, European Agencies: What about the Institutional Balance?, Maastricht Faculty of Law Wor-
king Paper, 4/2014, page 13; Chamon, op. cit. (n 25), page 1062.
93 Case C 98/80 Romano ECLI:EU:C:1981:104, para 20.
94 A. Türk, Case Law in the Area of the Implementation of EC Law, in: Pedler, Schaefer (eds), Shaping European 
Law and Policy: The Role of Committees and Comitology in the Political Process, European Institute of Public 
Administration, 1996, page 186.
95 Recalling also the fact that numerous agencies such as OHIM, CPVO and ECHA are already allowed to take 
binding decisions. See more: Chamon, op. cit. (n 25), page 1065.
96 Case C 270/12 ESMA ECLI:EU:C:2013:562, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, para 67.
97 Ibid., para 83 – 86.
98 Case C 270/12 ESMA ECLI:EU:C:2014:18, para 65; Case C 270/12 ESMA ECLI:EU:C:2013:562, Opinion of AG 
Jääskinen para 74.
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concluded that an EU agency can adopt legally binding acts, then (both, individual and 
general) legally binding acts are subject to a judicial review.
As regards the first issue, the problem of delegation of powers from Articles 290 and 
291 TFEU, AG Jääskinen and the Court parted in their reasoning. AG differed, in essence, 
between the aim of Article 290 TFEU delegated acts which give [exclusively] ‘the Com-
mission the power to adopt non-legislative acts of general application to supplement or 
amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative act’,99 and the delegation of Article 
291 TFEU implementing acts which enable ‘the promulgation of the normative content 
of the act that is being implemented, in a more detailed manner, in order to facilitate its 
application’.100 Since Article 290 TFEU delegated acts can change the content of the legi-
slative act, they, according to the AG, require a higher degree of democratic accountability 
for their bearer and thus can be delegated from the Union legislator solely to the Commi-
ssion under strict conditions.101 Article 291 TFEU implementing acts already envisages, in 
duly necessary cases, for the implementation of the legislative acts on the EU level by the 
Commission or the Council rather than on the primary MSs level. Even though agencies 
as the potential delegates are not explicitly mentioned in that article either, due to the re-
ferral to them in Article 263 TFEU, the AG sees their executive role as a ‘midway solution’ 
between the institutions and the MSs,102 especially when ‘complex technical assessments 
are required in order to implement an EU measure’.103
The Court on the other hand concluded that Articles 290 and 291 TFEU do not repre-
sent ‘a single legal framework under which certain delegated and executive powers may be 
attributed solely to the Commission’.104 Moreover, such a delegation of powers to agencies 
cannot be considered in isolation as a measure per se, but observed as an ‘integral part 
of a detailed legal framework’105 which is actually always conducted in cooperation on 
national and supranational level.106
Nevertheless, the fact that there is no mention of agencies as possible delegates in 
either of the articles, not even after the Treaty of Lisbon, cannot be avoided, and was la-
belled in academic discussions as a ‘[c]onstitutional neglect of the position of agencies 
in the institutional balance’.107 Discrepancy between the ever-growing role of the agencies 
in the Union’s functioning and their ‘constitutional anchoring in the EU legal order’108 is 
visible as ever, and the authors are positive that reality-legislature gap will be continuously 
challenged by the MSs if the latter is not going to be solidified.
The authors deem that here, as regard the Romano issue of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU 
in relation to the delegation of powers, as well as with the Meroni judgment, one has to 
take utmost regard of the context in which the ruling was brought, as well as to be aware 
of the changed context of today’s debate. 
In 1981, when the Romano judgment was delivered, the scope of the Union’s law and 
the amount of its tasks was significantly smaller than it is today, so either the Council 
or the Commission in the role of the delegate could have taken all binding decisions by 
99 Art 290(1) TFEU.
100 Case C 270/12 ESMA ECLI:EU:C:2013:562, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, para 77.
101 Ibid., para 76; Chamon doubts such reasoning. See more: Chamon, op. cit. (n 5), page 391.
102 Ibid., para 86.
103 ibid., para 87.
104 Case C 270/12 ESMA ECLI:EU:C:2014:18, para 78.
105 Ferran, op. cit. (n 81), page 82; Case C 270/12 ESMA ECLI:EU:C:2014:18, para 85.
106 Ferran, op. cit. (n 81).
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108 Chamon, op. cit. (n 5), page 398.
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themselves.109 Since their acts as the acts of the Treaty institutions would have been su-
pervised by the Court, there was no reason to allow the delegation of powers on the Ad-
ministrative Agency as the Union agency which escaped the Court’s judicial review.110 In 
essence, a) there was no practical need for agencies at the time, and b) assuming that the 
system of judicial review was the main concern, there was no practical need to enter into 
that problem since the institutions were fit for the job.
Then, the circumstances have changed, the EU grew in size and so did its legislative 
reach. Consequently, the institutions became overburdened and the process of ‘agenci-
fication’ started, so the Court took a more flexible stance towards powers of the Union 
agencies in the abovementioned Schräder and Rütgers cases of the beginning of the 
2000s. In the recent ESMA case the AG (referring to the written observations of the Euro-
pean Parliament) concluded that the conferral of certain implementing powers on agen-
cies has already been happening for such a long time, that an ‘express reference in the 
Treaty of Lisbon to its abolition would have been required to change this.’111
With the system of judicial review of agencies’ acts affirmed in the Treaties, the Court 
had a significant problem sorted out. As the Court ‘opened’ the system of Articles 290 
and 291 TFEU, and subsumed the delegation of powers under the Meroni conditions in 
the recent ESMA case, accompanied by stressing the advantage of the agencies as the 
bodies with the specific technical and professional expertise, one has no reason to doubt 
that the Court is ready to advocate for the Union agencies.
5. CONCLUSION – STATE OF PLAY OF THE AGENCY EMPOWERMENT IN 
THE EU
After undertaking the analysis, the authors would summarize the problem of vesting 
EU agencies with executive (i.e. implementing) powers into a single phrase: where there is 
a will, there is a way. The subsequent catch is, there are two ways which the EU could take.
In the situation where there was no mention of agencies in the Treaties, the system of 
judicial protection was not adjusted for the bodies outside the Treaty institutions and when 
agencies were not indispensable for the everyday functioning of the EU, the strictness of 
the Meroni and Romano ruling seems understandable. There was more logic in the pre-
cautionary narrowing of the scope of permitted delegation of powers on agencies than in 
venturing into rickety legal spheres. Nevertheless, as aforementioned, the amendments 
of the Treaty of Lisbon changed the articles, specifically Articles: 263, 265, 267 and 277 
TFEU, concerned with the system of judicial review, now explicitly stating that ‘[t]he Court 
of Justice of the European Union shall (…) review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or 
agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.’112 As pre-
viously discussed, if the lack of judicial supervision was the main impediment for allowing 
the transfer of executive powers on agencies, should not that problem now be considered 
ad acta? 
On the other hand, one must admit that the Treaty of Lisbon did not add the notion of 
bodies, offices or agencies into what was once article 155 EEC, but formed the system 
of delegated and implementing acts in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, referring only to the 
Commission for the former article and to the MSs, Commission and the Council for the 
latter article. It seems as if the EU, by vesting executive powers in its agencies, has gone 
109 Chamon, op. cit. (n 25), page 1073.
110 Ibid.
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by the logic that everything that is not prohibited is permitted.
Regardless, the ESMA judgment clearly followed that line of reasoning for the issue 
of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, upholding it with abovementioned ‘judicial review articles’ 
which ‘presuppose that such a possibility exists’.113
The practice of the Union legislator has showed through the process of ‘agencification’ 
that once the concerns of the Commission and the Council over their share of powers are 
observed,114 they find no objection to the establishment and empowering of the Union 
agencies. On the contrary, in the enlarged Union cooperating on the supranational level 
in many more areas, agencies with their technical expertise have become an unavoidable 
partner in the executive branch.
Therefore, in the changed legal and practical context, there is no need to mystify the 
old landmark cases. The authors are not advocating for the rejection of the Romano and 
Meroni judgments, but for a more pragmatic approach in the sphere of EU law. When the 
prospect of the change of Treaties is unlikely, and the way for agencies to function within 
Treaties current boundaries can be found, insisting on the case-law created in a different 
moment in time seems to come only from the defiance and from the lack of political will 
to cooperate.
Of course, it is reasonable to consider the ‘second path’ (which the authors mentioned 
at the beginning of this section) that the EU could take. That is, to defer future creation or 
conferral of powers on agencies, this time for real,115 until it finds a way to clearly determine 
a basis for their establishment and empowerment.
An imbalance between factual agencies’ positions in the executive and a lack of solid 
Treaty base for their functioning can always develop into a problem for the Union legislator. 
Deciding to proceed with the situation as such leaves the EU vulnerable to hampered ne-
gotiations with MSs over future legislation, as well as to possible challenges in front of the 
Court. It is up to EU to put all arguments on the scale and decide if this vagueness brings 
it more good or harm in the long run.
113 Case C 270/12 ESMA ECLI:EU:C:2014:18, para 79.
114 E.g., Opinion of the Council Legal service from 2013 concludes that almost all of the EU agency ‘Single Resolu-
tion Board’s powers have to be ‘further detailed in order to exclude that a wide margin of discretion is entrusted’ 
unless the EU legislator decides to involve ‘an institution of the Union vested with executive powers’ in the pro-
cess. See: Council of the European Union, Opinion of the Legal Service, CLS Banking Union, 14547:13/ 2013.
115 Commission Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, European agencies – The way 
forward, 135/2008.
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Delegacija izvršnih ovlasti agencijama Europske unije te 
Meroni i Romano doktrine
Sažetak
Cilj autora jest pružiti uvid u kompleksan svijet agencija Europske unije te sudske prak-
se koja je bila odlučujuća za razvitak njihove uloge unutar prava EU. Uzimajući u obzir nji-
hovu rastuću važnost u cjelokupnom institucionalnom sistemu EU te obujam prava koja im 
se povjeravaju, agencije su važne svim državama članicama, uključujući i Hrvatsku. Članak 
prvo objašnjava važnost Meroni i Romano presuda za agencije EU, nastavljajući s pregle-
dom novije sudske prakse čija formulacija dokazuje promjenu i razvoj u tumačenju prve 
dvije presude. U svom istraživanju, autori će pristupiti problemu delegacije ovlasti europ-
skim agencijama, između ostalog, iz perspektive primarnog zakonodavstva EU; sudske 
prakse Suda Europske unije; te iz recentne ali nesuglasne akademske pravne perspektive. 
Također, autori će dati svoje mišljenje i sud o trenutačnoj poziciji agencija unutar EU.
Ključne riječi: agencije EU, delegacija ovlasti, izvršne ovlasti, diskrecijska ocjena, sudski 
nadzor.
